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ABSTRACT
Web browsers have become the predominantmeans for developing
and deploying applications, and thus they often handle sensitive
data such as social interactions or financial credentials and infor-
mation. As a consequence, defensive measures such as TLS, the
Same-Origin Policy (SOP), and Content Security Policy (CSP) are
critical for ensuring that sensitive data remains in trusted hands.
Browser extensions, while a usefulmechanism for allowing third-
party extensions to core browser functionality, pose a security risk
in this regard since they have access to privileged browser APIs
that are not necessarily restricted by the SOP or CSP. Because of
this, they have become a major vector for introducing malicious
code into the browser. Prior work has led to improved security
models for isolating and sandboxing extensions, as well as tech-
niques for identifying potentially malicious extensions. The area
of privacy-violating browser extensions has so far been covered
by manual analysis and systems performing search on specific text
on network traffic. However, comprehensive content-agnostic sys-
tems for identifying tracking behavior at the network level are an
area that has not yet received significant attention.
In this paper, we present a dynamic technique for identifying
privacy-violating extensions in Web browsers that relies solely on
observations of the network traffic patterns generated by browser
extensions. We then present Ex-Ray, a prototype implementation
of this technique for the Chrome Web browser, and use it to eval-
uate all extensions from the Chrome store with more than 1,000
installations (10,691 in total). Our evaluation finds new types of
tracking behavior not covered by state of the art systems. Finally,
we discuss potential browser improvements to prevent abuse by
future user-tracking extensions.
1 INTRODUCTION
The browser has become the primary interface for interactions
with the Internet, from writing emails, to listening to music, to on-
line banking. The shift of applications from the desktop to theWeb
has made the browser the de-facto operating system. To augment
this experience browsers offer a powerful interface to access and
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modify websites. Among the available functionalities, extensions
can modify HTTP requests and responses, inject content into web-
sites, or execute programs as a background activity. This allows
for extensions that manage passwords, remove ads, or store book-
marks in the cloud.
The downside of this powerful interface is thatmalicious actions
at the extension level can lead to problems across all online activi-
ties for a user. Extensions can be considered as the “most danger-
ous code in the browser” [9]. Previous research found extensions
to inject or replace ads [1, 10, 29], causingmonetary damage to con-
tent creators and, in turn, consumers. To detect privacy-invasive
extensions, previous work used dynamic taint analysis to find spy-
ware in Internet Explorer BrowserHelper Objects (BHOs) [5]. With
previous research in mind, browser vendors can work to restrict
malicious extensions.
Google Chrome is considered the state of the art in secure brows-
ing. Chrome extensions can only be installed through a central-
ized store, and before being admitted they have to pass a review
process. Similar to Android apps, Chrome extensions can request
permissions to perform certain activities, and users can use this in-
formation to decide whether they want to install the extension or
not. Furthermore, if an extension is considered malicious after ad-
mission to the store, it can be remotely removed from clients. With
all these security features in mind, privacy in Chrome extensions
is still an open issue.
This work aims to understand to what extent browser exten-
sions violate user privacy expectations. In preliminary experiments,
we found suspicious activity in popular browser extensions and
confirmed that data is not only leaked, but furthermore is pro-
cessed by third parties. By presenting unique URLs to multiple
extensions, we were able to link incoming connections on a hon-
eypot to the particular extension responsible for leaking user data.
Inspired by these findings, we introduce Ex-Ray, a system that
can automatically detect history-stealing browser extensions with-
out depending on the specific protocol used or leaking methodol-
ogy. Our automated approach is based on analyzing the network
traffic generated by dynamically exercising unmodified extensions.
Extensions under test are executedwithin an instrumented browser
multiple times, and all network traffic generated during execution
is recorded. We decided to focus on the network activity gener-
ated by browser extensions because, while their code and logic can
change, they ultimately need to send the acquired information to
their controller, and this will be observable from network traffic.
Thus, our approach builds on a fundamental invariant of tracking
and user privacy violation. Furthermore, long term studies of mal-
ware have highlighted network activity as a particularly effective
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medium for detecting malicious activity [12]. We model features
that are intrinsic to the network traffic generated by trackers to dis-
tinguish malicious from benign traffic. We create complementary
detection systems in unsupervised and supervised fashion, and a
triage system which can classify the likelihood of a leak, easing
the burden on security analysts to identifymisbehaving extensions.
After identifying a set of extensions that leak private information
by looking at their network traffic, we develop a complementary
component that can infer if an extension is leaking sensitive infor-
mation by looking at the API calls that it invokes.
Ex-Ray automatically flagged 212 potential trackers in the top
10,691 extensions with a false detection rate of 0.27%. Our sys-
tem has found two tracking extensions which were not detected
by previous systems because they were leaking information using
a different channel than what was expected by those tools. More
precisely, one extension made use of strong encryption to obfus-
cate its behavior, and the other used WebSockets to exfiltrate user
information as opposed to HTTP(S).
In summary, the contributions of this work are as follows:
• Wedeveloped the first unsupervised system to detect history-
stealing browser extensions based on network traffic alone
that is also robust against obfuscation.
• We quantify the magnitude of user data leakage and in-
troduce a scoring system that is used to triage extensions.
Prioritized extensions are manually vetted and the result-
ing labeled dataset is made available to the research com-
munity.1
• We created a machine learning approach to classify exten-
sions that we use on API call traces generated by an instru-
mented browser. This approach reaches 96.43% F-Measure
value and the recall value is constantly over 99%.
2 MOTIVATION
This work focuses on tracking data collected from browsing be-
havior that is sent to third parties. As opposed to previous work
on history-leaking browser extensions [24], we aim for a system
that will detect leaks regardless of how they are transmitted or
collected. We target tracking either through background scripts
or modification to pages. The main difference between these two
approaches is that in the Web such trackers are only present on
websites that opt-in to use them. From a user’s perspective, tools
that remove these trackers are available and well understood. Con-
versely, tracking in extensions can cover all websites a user visits,
and there is no opt-in mechanism. Furthermore, no tools are read-
ily available that would warn a user of such behavior or block it.
Transferring the current host or URL can be a necessary part of
the functionality of an extension – for example, to check against
an online blacklist such as an adult content filter. However, we
found that often extensions also transfer URLs if no such checking
is necessary, or could be expected by the extension’s description,
exposing all browsing habits of a user and creating a breach of pri-
vacy. Furthermore, the specification of such functionality is often
buried deep in an extension’s description, if present at all. Web
1https://github.com/mweissbacher/exray-data
users are concerned about how their privacy is impacted [2, 15],
but are often unaware of what a privacy policy is.2
To provide additional context behind this sort of systemic privacy-
violating behavior on the part of browser extensions, we present
a detailed case study on a large actor in the history data collec-
tion market in Appendix A. In it, we demonstrate how a single li-
brary was tied to browsing data exfiltration in 42 extensions with
over 8 million installations. The extensions were deleted from the
Chrome Web Store within 24 hours of reporting.
2.1 HTTP URL Honeypot
To gain insight into the environment in which trackers operate,
we configured a honeypot. To test whether leaked URLs are ac-
cessed after being received by trackers, we exercised extensions
with domain names into which we encode their unique extension
ID.While executing in our container, extensions only interact with
local Web and DNS servers. However, we operate a Web server on
the public Internet to monitor client connections for such URLs.
As these domains are used uniquely for our experiments, HTTP
connections indicate leaks linkable to extensions. The connection
and execution times are displayed in Figure 1, and discussed in
more detail in Section 4. The confirmation that trackers are acting
on leaked data motivated further steps in this work. After exclud-
ing VPN and proxy extensions, we received incoming connections
from 38 extensions out of all Chrome extensions with more than
1,000 users.
2.2 Types of Trackers
Chrome offers a powerful interface to extensions, and while it can
be used to enhance the browsing experience, it can also be mis-
used to violate user privacy. There are multiple ways to collect
and exfiltrate browsing history.
Much like trackers that are added toWeb pages by their authors,
extensions can leak history by adding trackers to the body of Web
pages. An example of third-party tracking is the Facebook “Like”
button. These can be blocked by extensions such as Ghostery. A
more robust solution is sending collected history data via requests
of extension background scripts. Such requests are not subject to
interception by other extensions, and cannot be blocked as tracker
objects. Compared to tracking via inserting trackers into pages,
better coverage can be achieved.
To acquire browsing data, extensions can intercept requestsmade
by websites via the chrome.webRequest API, or poll tabs for the
URL using chrome.tabs. For past browsing behavior, the chrome.-
history API can be used. Diverse options to collect data render
finding a unified way to identify tracking extensions challenging.
2.3 Threat Model
Based on our honeypot results, we assume the following attacker
model. In our scenario the attacker is the owner of, or someone
who controls the content of, browser extensions. We assumemany
users will install these extensions with a cursory reading of the
extension’s description. While permissions can restrict the behav-
ior of browser extensions, capturing and exfiltrating history can
2http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-of-americans-dont-kno
w-what-a-privacy-policy-is/
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Figure 1: Extension execution with unique URLs compared to incoming connections to those URLs from the public Internet.
These connections confirm that leaked browsing history is used by the receivers, often immediately upon execution.
be performed with modest permissions that would not raise suspi-
cion. For instance, the browsing history permission is categorized
as low alert by Google.
The goal of our attacker is to indiscriminately capture URLs of
pages visited by the user while the extension is executed. Further-
more, we assume the adversary collects data with the purpose of
analysis or monetization. As the value of traffic patterns decreases
over time, we assume the attacker to be inclined to leak sooner
rather than later, which seems to be confirmed by our honeypot ex-
periments. A successful attacker would decrease the user’s privacy
as compared to using a browser without the extension in question.
We exclude from our threat model extensions that openly re-
quire the sharing of browsing history as part of their functionality,
such as VPNs. Also, we consider leaks purposeful and supposedly
accidental as equal, as we cannot reason well about developer in-
tent. As detecting and hiding malicious behavior is an arms race,
we prefer to be conservative and assume the attacker could esca-
late the sophistication of their evasion techniques in the future.
3 OUR APPROACH
In this section we describe the design of the approach underly-
ing Ex-Ray. To identify privacy-violating extensions, we exercise
them in multiple stages, varying the amount of private data sup-
plied to the browser, and in turn to the extension under test. Based
on the type of extension, the traffic usage can change depending
on the number of visited sites. However, the underlying assump-
tion is that benign extension traffic should not be influenced by
the size of the browsing history.
3.1 Overview
A high level overview of Ex-Ray is shown in Figure 2. The three
main components of the system are summarized as follows:
1) Unsupervised learning: We use counterfactual analy-
sis to detect history-stealing extensions based on network
traffic. This component is fully unsupervised and, by def-
inition, prone to misinterpretations.
2) Triage-based analysis: We manually vet the output of
our unsupervised system, i.e., we verify which extensions
UNSUPERVISED
SUPERVISED
Vetted
Dataset
CAUSALITY TRIAGE
Unlabeled
Dataset
LEARNINGDETECTION
{leaking,	
not-leaking}
Figure 2: Ex-Ray architectural overview. A classification
system combines unsupervised and supervisedmethods. Af-
ter triaging unsupervised results, a vetted dataset is used to
classify extensions based on n-grams of API calls.
are factually leaking andwhich are not. As themanual ver-
ification is costly, we rely on a scoring system that ranks
extensions based on how likely they are to be leaking in-
formation to aid the process.
3) Supervised learning: We systematize the identification
of suspicious extensions using supervised learning over
the resulting labeled dataset. This component takes into
account the behavior of the extension and builds a model
that detects history leaks (i.e., it looks at theAPI callsmade
by the browser extension when executed).
We see different types of tracking used in browser extensions.
Some intercept requests and issue additional requests to trackers.
Others transfer aggregate data periodically, while still others insert
trackers into every visited page. An integral part of all trackers
is transferring data to an external server—simply put, this crucial
step is what enables trackers to track.
Our work focuses on indiscriminate tracking across all pages.
To track, a history item (hi ) generated by the browser will be re-
ported either in isolation or in aggregate. In either case, the size
of history items affects network behavior. We argue that network
data generated by an effective tracker, independently of protocol
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Figure 3: Comparison in change of traffic between exten-
sions leaking history and benign ones. With increasing his-
tory, each bar displays the change of sent data. For exten-
sions that leak, sent data projects an ascending slope as a
function of size of history.
andwhether plain, encrypted, or otherwise obfuscated has to grow
as a function of history.
We execute extensions in multiple stages increasing the amount
of private information. Each hi should contain less information
than the following stage, hi < hi+1. We increase the size of hi
in each stage, extending the length of the testing URLs. For exam-
ple, example.com/example/index.html in stage 0, and example.com
/example/<500characters>/index.html in stage 10. The expected
growth in traffic is h∆. This intuition is confirmed from Figures 3a
and 3b where the boxplots clearly show that trackers usually send
more data when there is more history to leak while the amount of
data is constant across the different stages for benign extensions.
For deterministic tracking, the traffic deltas of adjacentmeasure-
ments should project an ascending slope. However, the browser
history may be sent compressed in order to send as few bytes as
possible and avoid the leak being visible as plain text in the pay-
load. This operation would reduce the number of bytes sent while
retaining the same amount of information (entropy). Per informa-
tion theory, message entropy has an upper bound that cannot be
exceeded. As consequence, the size of compressed messages has a
lower bound as a function of the message entropy. For our exper-
iments, we used compression tools (bzip2, 7zip, xz) to establish a
practical lower bound of sent data for each stage as 289 Bytes, 6.9
KB, 14 KB and 30 KB.
Extensions that use trackers establish connections with each ex-
ecution. Consequently, any group of hosts that results in less mea-
surements than the number of executions will not be considered
for further analysis. Examples of hosts that extensions only con-
nect to occasionally are ads.
3.2 Network Counterfactual Analysis
The goal of this phase is to model the way in which modifica-
tions to the browsing history influence observed network traffic.
Figure 3 shows that there is a monotonic increase in sent traffic
between successive stages of privacy-violating extension. Exten-
sions that, on the contrary, are privacy-respecting show no sig-
nificant difference. An observation we made during the analysis
of traffic behavior is that privacy-violating extensions might ex-
hibit non-leaking behavior when connecting to certain domains.
Thus, it is important to consider individual flows when building
our model. Additionally, we observed that variations exhibited by
privacy-violating extensions are well-fit by linear regression.
Thus, we use linear regression on each set of flows to estimate
the optimal set of parameters that support the identification of
history-leaking extensions. We aim to establish a causality relation
between two variables: (i) the amount of raw data sent through
the network, and (ii) the amount of history leaked to a given do-
main. For this, we rely on the counterfactual analysis model by
Lewis [13], where:
The model establishes that, in a fully controlled
environment, if we have tests in which we change
only one input variable, and we observe a change
in the output, then the variable and the output are
linked by a relation of causality.
In our case, the input variable is the amount of history, the out-
put is the number of bytes sent in the different flows, and the tests
are run with both malware and benign samples. Our framework
allows us to evaluate this relationship by means of different statis-
tical tests, such as Bayesian inference. This is ideal for situations
were there is no deterministic relationship between the variables,
such as in targeted advertisement tracking. Although our frame-
work is designed tomodel these scenarios, in practice, we observed
that leaking extensions behave in a deterministic fashion.
In order to systematically identify the conditions under which
the causality link is established, we run three steps. The first step
is performed before applying linear regression, while the second
and third steps are based on the linear regression parameters.
(1) Minimum Intercept. While the extension might com-
municate to a domain in all given stages, the content trans-
mitted may not contain a privacy leak. This step verifies
whether the amount of data sent exceeds a certain thresh-
old. This threshold is set based on the size of the history
compressed as described in Section 3.1.
(2) Minimum Slope. In this work we are primarily inter-
ested in extensions that actively track users. This type
of extensions is expected to leak as much history data as
possible from the user. This implies that the relationship
between stages is expected to be linear and have a con-
stant variance, modulo any sort of attempt at obfuscation.
Based on this, we set a threshold to the slope in order to
exclude all those extensions that do not fully meet these
two criteria.
(3) Level of Confidence. Depending on the extension, the
fitted regression model might not always be strictly lin-
ear. We can choose to apply certain bounds (lower, upper,
or both) from a fitted model to adjust the precision of the
output. Choosing bounds that are very close to the fitted
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model will give a higher level of confidence in the deci-
sion. On the contrary, a very relaxed model will capture
boundary cases at the cost of introducing false positives.
We define the term flagging policy as the set of parameters used
for these checks. A strict policy is a policy in which parameters se-
lect a restricted area and flag less flows than a relaxed policy which
flags many more flows as suspected of leaking browsing history.
The notion of confidence described above and the use of the
different policies is precisely what motivates our triage system de-
scribed next.
3.3 Extension Triage
After determining which extensions could potentially be leaking
history in an unsupervised way, we manually vet those results.
The goal of this phase is to design a score that quantifies history
leakage and prioritize the manual analysis. For that, we first define
a function L that estimates the number of URLs leaked between
two controlled experiments such that
L(si , sj ) =
|sj | − |si |
τ
. (1)
Here, |sj | and |si | are the number of bytes sent to a given domain
in stages i and j respectively, while τ is a threshold that estimates
the expected growth hδ between i and j. This threshold is based
on the size of the URLs used in the experiment described in Sec-
tion 3.1. We abuse notation for the sake of simplicity and denote s
when we refer to a transition between two consecutive stages with
increasing exercised browsing history.
Given an extension x , we then obtain a score by multiplying the
number of URLs leaked between two consecutive stages s:
score(x) =
∏
s
eL(s). (2)
Note that we aim at obtaining a rough understanding of which
extensions could be leaking URLs. Thus, we are mainly interested
in high values of L(s). We use an exponential function of L(s) to
prioritize extensions that are leaking in all stages but also to find a
trade-off between extensions that only show a leak in some of the
stages. Positive and large values will then output a high score.
Negative values of L(s)mean that the total amount of data sent
in the earliest stage is higher than the amount sent in the latest.
Intuitively this means that data sent in each stage does not depend
on the size of URLs in the browser history. Our score then treats
these cases as an exponential decay function, giving less weight to
those stages and outputting values closer to score(x) ≃ 0. Like-
wise, when the amount of data exchanged between stages is ex-
actly the same (i.e., L(s) ≃ 0), the scoring function will then output
score(x) ≃ ∏ e0 ≃ 1. One could obtain a probability of the likeli-
hood of a leak by scaling the score to the interval [0, 1]. However,
as our system currently aims only at prioritizing extensions, giving
a rough notion of risk (without scaling the output) suffices. Thus,
we consider the following thresholds as a general rule of thumb
when triaging extensions:
leak(x) =

not-leaking if score(x) ≤ 1
possibly-leaking if 1 < score(x) ≤ 100
likely-leaking otherwise.
(3)
Very large values of score(x) show a high confidence that the ex-
tension is aggressively tracking users.
It is important to highlight that the triage stage is optional. An
ideal setting with endless human resources would obviate the need
to prioritize extensions and, thus, render the triage stage merely
informative. In practice, extension markets are very large and
human workers tend to be constrained time-wise, which can be
a bottleneck for the verification process. In this case, having a
triage system would be valuable. For the purposes of this paper,
when labeling the outputs given by the unsupervised module, we
have invested human effort in manually vetting extensions that
are primarily ranked as likely-leaking (for positive samples) and
not-leaking (for negative samples). We also look at a fraction of
possibly-leaking extensions in a best-effort fashion.
3.4 History Leakage Detection
The last component of our system aims at systematizing the iden-
tification of unwanted extensions from a behavioral point of view.
For that, we instrument the browser to monitor dynamically rele-
vant behaviors of the extension during runtime. This component
operates in a fully supervised manner and is composed of the fol-
lowing two phases:
• Learning: The system is trained using the dataset labeled
in the previous phase, building a model of the most dis-
criminatory runtime behaviors.
• Detection: The system is deployed to detect previously
unknown privacy-violating extensions.
Predictions can be then used (i) to obtain a better understand-
ing of how extensions (mis)use the user’s private information; and,
(ii) to discover previously unknown privacy-violating extensions
than can then be analyzed by the triage component. As a result, the
list of labeled samples together with the model can be extended.
We implemented our classification algorithm using Extra Ran-
domized Trees. We choose this classifier due to its efficiency over
several types of classification problems [6]. However, our frame-
work accepts a wide range of classifiers. Likewise, the system can
learn from several types of features. For the purposes of this paper,
we limit our analysis to behaviors related to history leaking. In par-
ticular, we profile the way in which extensions interact with cer-
tain components of the Application Programming Interface (API)
exported to extensions by Chrome.
From all API traces that are extracted, we model the way in
which consecutive calls are invoked using n-grams. This detec-
tion method has been widely explored for the identification of ma-
licious software. As explained in prior work [25, 28], n-grams are
particularly useful to model sequences of elements. The number
associated to the “n” is the length of each examined sequence; the
system receives labeled sequences and uses them to train a classi-
fier in order to recognize from the sequences of an unknown sam-
ple to which label the sample should be assigned. In our system
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we tried different depths of the n-grams, namely 1, 2, and 6, and
the sequences are consecutive API calls invoked by the extension.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Ex-Ray in finding
extensions that leak browser history. We describe our experimen-
tal methodology and results.
4.1 Experimental Setting
An overview of our experimental setup is depicted in Figure 4.
Next, individual components are discussed in detail.
Extension Containers. As part of our test environment, we cre-
ated websites that allow scaling the size of aWeb client’s browsing
history without otherwise changing the behavior of websites. We
use local Web and DNS servers so that the browser can connect
to our website without sending information to the public Inter-
net. For each execution, we start the experiment from an empty
cache in a Docker container using an instrumented Chromium bi-
nary. We exercise each extension four times for five minutes each,
capturing all generated network traffic. Capturing traffic on the
container level provides a full picture of each extension’s network
interactions.
To reduce measurement noise, we block traffic to Google update
services and CRLsets3 via DNS configuration. We also disable fea-
tures such as SafeBrowsing and account synchronization.
Considering the maximum URL length of 2,083 characters, we
increase the length by 500 characters between stages. Other than
changing the length of URLs used, the pages served to the instru-
mented browsers do not change between stages. The maximum
length of URLs generated by us is below 1,600, leaving sufficient
space for trackers that submit URLs as GET parameters. For each
execution we open 20 pages; thus, if all URLs were transmitted un-
compressed we would expect an increase of 10 KB per stage. We
store DNS information to group IP traffic by hostname.
ExtensionDataset. Wecrawled the ChromeWeb Store and down-
loaded extensions with 1,000 or more installations. For our analy-
sis, we only consider extensions that can be loaded without crash-
ing. Examples of extensions that could not be loaded are those
with manifest files that cannot be parsed or referencing files that
are missing from the packages. We discarded 334 such extensions,
which left 10,691 extensions for Ex-Ray to analyze.
To establish baseline ground truth, we searched for different
types of tracking extensions. We did not use the extensions men-
tioned in Appendix A as they were not available in the store at
the time of these experiments, and the future behavior of tracker
endpoints was unclear.
Wemainly relied on two approaches to discover history-leaking
extensions:
• Heuristic search. We look for suspicious hostnames, key-
words in network traffic, and apply heuristics to traffic pat-
terns. Through manual verification we confirmed 100 be-
nign extensions and 53 privacy-violating extensions. The
3gvt1.com, redirector.gvt1.com, clients1.google.com, clients4.google.com
Extension Web 
Store
Container Processing Cloud
Crawler
Trace Analysis
Local 
Extension 
Store
Flagged 
Samples
PCAP
Local 
Webserver
Local DNS
Execution Container
The Internet
Figure 4: Ex-Ray extension execution overview. After down-
loading extensions from the ChromeWeb Store, we exercise
them in containers to collect traces for classification.
dataset contains different types of samples, including ag-
gregate data collection and delivery over HTTP(S) and
HTTP2.
• Honeypot probe. We registered extensions interacting
with our honeypot and verified 38 as connecting back from
the public Internet. Figure 1 shows a map of all incoming
connections with respect to the time we exercised the ex-
tension with unique URLs in the history. Table 1 shows
the most installed five malicious extensions with domains
connecting to the honeypot. Connections often appear im-
mediately after running the extension, but we detected de-
ferred crawls as well.
We excluded VPN and proxy extensions that redirect traffic via a
remote address, as these are not part of our threat model. The con-
necting clients performed no malicious activities we could iden-
tify in our log files. The hostnames of clients that connected to
us varied widely. The most popular one was kontera.com with
704 connections, followed by AWS endpoints. Interestingly, we
received many requests from home broadband connections, such
as *.netbynet.ru, often connecting only once. However, we con-
nected four graphs of extensions that were contacted from the
same hosts. The biggest graph connects eight extensions with two
hosts. The other graphs link five, two, and two extensions. We
compiled the data of possible collaboration into Table 3, which is
located in the Appendix due to space limitations.
Twelve of these extensionswere removed from the ChromeWeb
Store before our experiments concluded. We did not report these,
and we have no indication that the removal could be related to
privacy leaks.
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Extension Name installations Connecting from
Stylish - Custom
themes
1,671,326 *.bb.netbynet.ru,
*.moscow.rt.ru,
*.spb.ertelecom.ru
Pop Up Blocker for
Chrome
1,151,178 *.aws.kontera.com,
176.15.177.229,
*.bb.netbynet.ru
Desprotetor de Links 251,016 *.aws.kontera.com,
*.moscow.rt.ru,
*.bb.netbynet.ru
Открытые вкладки
(Open Tabs)
97,204 *.dnepro.net,
109.166.71.185,
*.k-telecom.org
Similar Sites 45,053 *.aws.kontera.com,
*.moscow.rt.ru,
*.netbynet.ru
Table 1: Top five extensions connecting to our honeypot
with highest installation numbers which are still available
in the Chrome Web Store.
4.2 Ex-Ray Results
Tuning of the Unsupervised Component. The first step of Ex-Ray
consists of applying linear regression for counterfactual analysis.
The linear regression test flags flows if they respect the three pa-
rameters explained in Section 3.2. To find the best configuration of
these parameters, it is necessary to evaluate the results on a labeled
dataset. We use F-Measure as a comparison metric. The strictest
policy checks for a minimum of five URLs leaked, a 2% minimum
slope, and 90% accuracy. This policy results in an F-Measure of
96.9% and no false positives.
To obtain better results, in our final configuration we use two
less strict configurations and flagged as suspicious all flows flagged
in both engines. Both configurations check for a minimum of two
URLs leaked and 2%minimum slope. However, there is a difference
in the last check: while one uses 90% accuracy in checking only the
lower bound, the other one uses 80% accuracy checking both the
upper and lower bound. As such, the first and last checks are less
strict, but the F-Measure does not decrease even if a larger area of
the feature space can be flagged. The system correctly flags more
flows as with the stricter configuration, but the flows belong to the
same extensions already flagged by the previous system.
Labeling Performance. Ex-Ray flagged 212 extensions out of 10,691
as history-leaking using linear regression on the traffic sent by ex-
tensions. By checkingmanually, we noticed that not all the flagged
extensions were leaking history. Out of 212 samples, 184 did leak,
two were benign, and 26 we could not confirm as clearly benign.
It has not been possible to determine if among those 26 extensions
there were ones leaking or not. Therefore, to provide a conserva-
tive evaluation, we consider Ex-Ray to have 28 benign extensions
wrongly identified as history-leaking.
As mentioned earlier, detection systems can be prone to false
negatives. To measure this for our system, we spot-checked a
representative sample of extensions reported as benign. To estab-
lish baseline false negatives we scanned our pcap files for leaks
and reimplemented another system used for brute-force search-
ing extension traffic for obfuscated strings with a fixed set of al-
gorithms [24]. This system flagged 367 extensions which we used
for our dataset. The false negative samples we subjected to exam-
ination numbered 178. These results lead to a precision of 87%,
a recall value equal to 50.13%, and an F1-Measure value equal to
63.66%. The overall accuracy value is 98.03%. These values are
reached using only the first step of Ex-Ray that is a completely un-
supervised algorithm. As we show below, these results are further
improved by the next phases of our system.
Among the extensions flagged by Ex-Ray, there are some inter-
esting case studies (such as the Web of Trust extension) which are
discussed thoroughly in Section 5.1.
Prioritizing Extensions. Extensions processed in the previous step
are then ranked using the score function defined in Section 3.3.
Ideally, a triage system should prioritize extensions that are more
likely to be privacy-violating than others. This way, the analyst
can invest most of their efforts on specimens that are likely to be
worth exploring. Other than the ranking of extensions, Ex-Ray
provides a report with an informative breakdown of the contribu-
tion of each network flow to the overall score. This is also useful
to the analyst for further investigation. We next show snippets of
a triage report for three extensions that are ranked high, medium,
and low:
cicimfkkbejhggfjaabggafffgdnjgjp
4e+18 connectionstrenth.com
394.88 a.pnamic.com
28.22 eluxer.net
4.48 rules.similardeals.net
1.16 code.jquery.com
pmmbokildidpgafchfmebmhpoeiganhj
89.22 static-opt1.kizi.com
89.22 cdn-opt0.kizi.com
89.29 cdn-opt1.kizi.com
6.12 tpc.googlesyndication.com
3.15 securepubads.g.doubleclick.net
pogchimbndbckepmhaagnapfmlfgnala
1.00 www.gstatic.com
1.00 chromium-i18n.appspot.com
1.00 ssl.gstatic.com
1.00 localhost
0.67 www.google.com
The snippet first displays the unique identifier of the extension,
followed by the score given to each of the network flows used to al-
legedly leak the history. As mentioned before, we group network
flows by hostname using DNS information captured during the
execution. When considering the thresholds introduced in Equa-
tion 3, the recommendation given by our triage system for these ex-
tensions is likely-leaking, possibly-leaking, and not-leaking
respectively.
As mentioned, these recommendations are manually verified.
The analysis starts with review of permissions and source code,
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looking for access to chrome.tabs, chrome.webRequest intercep-
tion, and other methods of history access. Next, an analyst checks
for elements inserted into the DOM that leak the referrer. Finally,
requests generated by background scripts and other recorded net-
work traffic is checked.
To quantify the performance of our triage system, we first study
how it ranks extensions given by the unsupervised system with re-
spect to the baseline ground truth described above (see Section 4.1).
73 extensions are flagged as likely-leaking. Out of those, all but
one were manually verified to leak (99%).
Next, the analyst is tasked with verifying 121 additional exten-
sions from the possibly-leaking category. Out of those, only one
is confirmed to be benign, 24 are marked as inconclusive, and the
rest (80%) are confirmed to leak. When ordering the triage score
from the bottom, it is easy to find extensions that behave legiti-
mately. For the purpose of this paper, the analyst vetted approxi-
mately 100 extensions as not-leaking.
We emphasize that the purpose of this phase is not to exhaus-
tively label all leaking extensions, nor to obtain a comprehensive
understanding of non-leaking extensions. Instead, the aim is to
obtain a slice of those extensions where the quality of the ground
truth is enough to apply supervised learning. As a byproduct of
this manual verification, we have gained a number of insights into
the ecosystem of unwanted extensions which is discussed later in
the Section 5.
Classification Results. Our last experiment evaluates the effec-
tiveness of the supervised system introduced in Section 3.4. We
aim at understanding the performance of Ex-Ray in classifying
leaking extensions using API call traces.
We rely on the dataset labeled and vetted in previous stages of
our experiment. We split the dataset between training and test-
ing set using a k-fold cross-validation approach, which has been
widely applied in the past [19].
To collect behavioral data from extensions, we implemented a
Clang LibTooling program that instruments Chromium’s source
code. In particular, we instrumented the following components of
the Chromium framework: extensions, chrome/browser/extensions,
and chrome/browser/extensions.4
To evaluate the results, we refer to precision (or positive predic-
tive value) and recall (or sensitivity). With reference to detecting
leaking extensions, we judge the performance by the F1-score, as
it represents the harmonic mean of precision and recall. For the
sake of completeness we also report the proportion of correct pre-
dictions (accuracy).
Table 2 shows results over a five-fold split using random sam-
pling. Classification results indicate that we can accurately iden-
tify when extensions are leaking by examining their behavior. Af-
ter evaluating different sizes of n-grams, we obtained our best re-
sults with n = 2 at 96.43% F1 followed by n = 6. When looking
at the histogram of APIs executed by the extension (n = 1), the
performance drops about 7%.
Among themost informative features in our best setting, we can
observe calls to different API packages related to the manipulation
4Excluding unit tests files, we inserted 11,132 trace points in 923 files collecting 6,125
function parameters.
Type Prec. Recall ACC F1
n-gram=1 87.36% 98.19% 87.30% 92.46%
n-gram=2 93.56% 99.49% 94.14% 96.43%
n-gram=6 92.18% 99.23% 92.70% 95.58%
Table 2: n-gram classification results for varying n.
of URLs such as extensions.common.url_pattern, as well as the ma-
nipulation of runtime code (JavaScript) associated with the prefer-
ences of an extension. In particular, the following two API calls are
predominantly seen together in history-leaking extensions: exten-
sions.browser.extension_prefs.GetExtensionPref()→ chrome.browser.-
extensions.shared_user_script_master.GetScriptsMetadata().
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we describe and discuss a number of findings re-
sulting from this work. First, we present two new types of track-
ing behavior found using our system. We then present the most
prevalent types of trackers and discuss their fundamental differ-
ences together with the issues due to invasive tracking. Finally,
we discuss evasion strategies.
5.1 High Profile Leaks
We cover two particularly relevant cases. These pose new chal-
lenges as they are immune to state of the art privacy leak detection
systems. Both were discovered through unsupervised detection by
Ex-Ray.
WOT: Web of Trust, Website Reputation Ratings. Web of Trust
(WOT) is a widely used extension with 1.2M installations. The ex-
tension gives users a ranking of trustworthiness of visitedwebsites.
WOT came under scrutiny in March 2016 when it was found to be
selling browsing data.5 A feature that distinguishes WOT from
other extensions is usage of strong encryption at the extension
level. It comes with a cryptographic library (crypto.js) that en-
crypts tracking payloads with RC4 on top of transfer via HTTPS,
thus hiding contents from data leakage analysis systems that can
interpose on and inspect HTTPS content. This extension was auto-
matically flagged by Ex-Ray with a triage score of 61,598 (outstand-
ing, given that > 1 is considered suspicious) and is undetectable by
currently available systems that rely on string matching and can
be evaded by the use of encryption [24].
The permissions requested by WOT are access to all sites, the
ability to modify requests, and access to all tabs. The library will
track every visitedwebsite, includingwebsites on internal networks.
POST data or keystrokes are not monitored, however.
While the history leak is part of the advertised functionality,
less invasive ways of implementation are possible. Either storing
the reputation database in the extension, or only sending the do-
main portion to the server, as opposed to the whole URL. For ex-
ample, Google Safe Browsing offers similar functionality via an
offline database.
5https://thehackernews.com/2016/11/web-of-trust-addon.html
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CouponMate: Coupon Codes & Deals. CouponMate is a shop-
ping application that offers to help users search for applicable coupons.
This extension collects and leaks browsing data via WebSockets, a
recently-standardized protocol not analyzed by prior work [24],
but one that is rising in popularity. In our dataset we found that
103 (0.96%) of extensions use WebSockets. Unlike previous work,
Ex-Ray is oblivious to protocols and flagged this extension with a
triage score of 20.1, which is a high alert for a human analyst.
Similarly toWeb of Trust, the leaks are part of themain function-
ality. However, implementing it in a more privacy-aware fashion
is possible. For example by adding a button to perform a search
for coupons on demand, as opposed to sending every URL.
5.2 Browser-enabled Tracking
Trackers are popular on websites and well-studied. However, they
are fundamentally different from tracking in browser extensions.
Websites need to opt-in to use a tracker, and their scope is lim-
ited to their ownwebsite unless purposefully shared. Furthermore,
visitors can use tracker-blockers to opt-out of tracking with ex-
tensions such as Ghostery. Conversely, in browser extensions the
scope of tracking is not limited to a single website, but collects in-
formation on all websites the extension has permission to access.
Furthermore, no tools exist to reduce the impact on privacy.
Mozilla Firefox. Using a prototype we developed for Firefox ex-
tensions, we scanned the most popular available ones in the store.
We found five extensionswith over 400,000 total installationswhich
were tracking user behavior outside of extensions, and reported
them to Mozilla. Out of these, three were removed from the store
because they did not disclose tracking in their privacy statement.
However, this type of tracking is generally tolerated for Firefox,
and as a result we have not further pursued notifications on that
platform.
5.3 Foundations Towards Solutions
A combination of these suggested solutions would mitigate the
problem of invasive tracking in browser extensions:
• Analyze extensions submitted to extension storeswith tools
that check for tracking behavior, such as our proposed sys-
tem Ex-Ray. Users can then be warned that their browsing
history will potentially be leaked.
• Implement a new browser extension API to inspect and
block traffic to trackers generated by other extensions in
background scripts. No such API currently exists. Filter-
ing approaches have proven effective for tracking on web-
sites. This could be used in conjunction with established
blacklists (e.g.: EasyList), or further extended with entries
generated by systems such as Ex-Ray. An integration into
this model could help filter background traffic.
• Consider invasive tracking as a violation of the single pur-
pose rule in extension stores, analogously to ad injection.
Such a policy would incentivize authors to prevent leaks
themselves.
5.4 Evasion
Malware evading detection systems is a well-explored area and
is part of the arms race between attackers and defenders. Exam-
ples of this include fingerprinting analysis environments or creat-
ing more stealthy programs. While no ultimate solutions exist for
these problems, Ex-Ray addresses tracking at a fundamental level.
Another approach would be to lay dormant and only leak at a
later point in time. However, we have seen with our honeypot ex-
periments that if leaks are utilized, this often happens immediately.
Furthermore, there is an economic incentive on the part of attack-
ers to obtain and monetize leaked history as quickly as possible
before its value begins to degrade.
Extensions could also pad sent history to show stable traffic be-
havior or create noise. However, this would either limit the leak-
age capacity or be easy to detect from simple checks applied by cur-
rent defense systems if extensions regularly send large amounts of
data to mask leakage.
6 RELATEDWORK
As with any Web application, browser extensions are third-party
code. However, these programs operate with elevated privileges
and have access to powerful APIs that can allow access to all con-
tent within the browser. Permission systems allow developers to
restrict their programs, but extensions have been shown to over-
request permissions, effectively de-sensitivizing users. Heule et
al. [9] showed that 71% of the top 500 Chrome extensions use per-
missions that support leaking private information. They proposed
an extension design based on mandatory access control to protect
user privacy when browsing.
Previouswork on privacy-violating browser extensions has found
them to be a prevalent problem. It was shown that official exten-
sion store quality checks fail to remove such perpetrators. Blog
posts havemanually analyzed extensions [3, 27] and Starov et al. stud-
ied leaks based on keyword search [24]. In contrast, Ex-Ray does
not require searching for particular strings and is oblivious to the
protocols used by extensions.
IBEX [8] is a research framework to statically verify access con-
trol and data flow policies of extensions. Developers have to au-
thor their extensions in high-level type safe languages; .NET and
a JavaScript subset are supported. Policies are specified in Datalog
and allow for finer-grained control as compared to contemporary
permission systems.
Egele et al. [5] used a dynamic taint analysis approach based on
the QEMU system emulator to detect spyware in Internet Explorer
Browser Helper Objects (BHO). BHOs are classified as malicious if
they leak sensitive information on the process level.
Hulk [10] is a system that was used for the first large-scale dy-
namic analysis of Chrome extensions. The authors introduced the
concept of Honeypages. This technique generates Web content tai-
lored to an extension to trigger malicious behavior driven by ex-
pectations of the extension.
To monetize extensions, maliciously-inclined authors may add
or replace ads in the browser with their own. In 2015, a study
found 249 Chrome extensions in the Chrome Web Store injecting
unwanted ads [26]. The authors identified two drops in their mea-
surement of ad injection. They correlate to Chrome blocking side
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loading of extensions, and introduction of the single purpose rule
to the Chrome store.
Contemporary websites use a plethora of third-party services
that enable developers to quickly add functionality. As a downside,
user privacy suffers, sincewhenwebsites include content from a re-
mote source the trust a user puts into a website is delegated. Nick-
iforakis et al. [18] studied these delegations and highlighted how
widespread this behavior is. As an example, Google Analytics was
included in 68% of the top 10,000 websites.
Third-party tracking on websites has been studied extensively.
Browsing on seemingly unrelated sites can be observed by third-
party trackers and combined into a comprehensive browsing his-
tory. Mayer et al. introduced the FourthParty measurement plat-
form [17], discussing privacy implications, technology, and policy
perspectives of third-party tracking. Roesner et al. [20] developed
client-side defenses to classify and prevent third-party tracking.
Recent work has analyzed the history of Web tracking via the In-
ternet Archive’s Wayback Machine [11]. The authors found that
tracking has steadily increased since 1996. Tracking on the Web
has never been as pervasive as it is now.
Browsers are not the only platform prone to leaks of private
data. In PiOS [4], Egele et al. statically analyzed applications from
iOS app stores. While only a few applications were identified as
leaking private user data, more than half leaked unique phone iden-
tifiers that can be used by third parties to profile users. Similarly,
AndroidLeaks [7] uses data-flow analysis to evaluate Android ap-
plications for leaks of private data; they verified leaks in 2,342 ap-
plications. Lever et al. show in a longitudinal study ofmalware [12]
that analysis of network traffic is a key factor to early detection.
In the first step of Ex-Ray, we apply linear regression in or-
der to evaluate causality relations [13]. Counterfactual analysis
is a relatively simple, but powerful model which has been used
in malware traffic analysis before [16]. The authors focused on
distinguishing when a certain kind of malware sample acted dif-
ferently from usual behavior due to certain user activity (triggers).
As the work presented noise and some mislabeled conversations,
the authors applied Bayesian Inference to assess causality between
specific user actions and malware families. In our case, the ab-
sence of false positives among the extensions that were not leak-
ing avoided the use of statistical methods to determine whether
there is a relation of causality between being a browser extension
leaking browser history or not. Linear regression [21] is widely
used, for instance as a preparatory step before applying machine
learning [23], or as an embedded technique as in SVM [22].
7 LIMITATIONS
Ex-Ray’s goal is to flag extensions that collect private data such as
browsing history and exfiltrate it to third parties. An actor with
the goal to collect user data is interested in collecting it in real time,
which is supported by the samples we analyzed.
It is possible that extensions only exfiltrate data after waiting for
a period longer than our tests. However, this is at odds with eco-
nomic incentives due to the decreasing value of leaked data over
time, and is thus unlikely from the perspective of the malicious
actor. Tracking for the purpose of analysis of large-scale user be-
havior requires timely data on all websites. The scope of our work
is identifying wholesale tracking through extensions.
Extensions that are narrow in scope, e.g., that collect data for a
specific website, would not be flagged by our system. We consider
stealing of private data on a wider scale. To enhance our system,
an approach similar to honeypages in Hulk [10] could be used.
Malicious software that only triggers on narrow conditions can
be impossible to exercise. For example, authors could assemble
code based on environmental parameters unknown to analysts. A
famous example is the Gauss malware.6 This malware will only
trigger on computers that have a specific configuration and is oth-
erwise not decryptable. Global efforts to analyze this malware
have failed to date.
Knowing the specifics of our tool, malicious developers could
apply evasion techniques, for example transferring a constant amount
of data per visitedwebsite by paddingURLs or captured keystrokes.
Evasion is a general concern for any detection system and there ex-
ist several avenues to address this [14].
8 CONCLUSION
With this paper we introduce new methods of detecting privacy-
violating browser extensions independently of their protocol. We
use a combination of supervised and unsupervised methods to find
features characteristic to tracking in extensions. We present Ex-
Ray, a prototype implementation of our approach for the Chrome
browser, and find two extensions in the official ChromeWeb Store
which leak private information in previously undetectable ways.
Privacy leaks in browser extensions are in an arms race, with ex-
tensions evading known methods of detection of previous work.
We suggest that extensions should be both tested more rigorously
when admitted to the store, as well as monitored while they exe-
cute within browsers.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thisworkwas supported by theNational Science Foundation (NSF)
under grant CNS-1409738, the EPSRC under grant EP/N008448/1,
an EPSRC-funded Future Leaders in Engineering and Physical Sci-
ences award, and Secure Business Austria.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Arshad, A. Kharraz, and W. Robertson. Identifying extension-based ad injec-
tion via fine-grained web content provenance. In Proceedings of the 19th Interna-
tional Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID), Paris,
FR, 2016.
[2] L. F. Cranor, J. Reagle, andM. S. Ackerman. Beyond concern: Understanding net
users’ attitudes about online privacy. The Internet upheaval: raising questions,
seeking answers in communications policy, pages 47–70, 2000.
[3] detectify labs. Chrome extensions - aka total absence of privacy. https://labs
.detectify.com/2015/11/19/chrome-extensions-aka-total-absence-of-privacy/,
2015.
[4] M. Egele, C. Kruegel, E. Kirda, and G. Vigna. PiOS: Detecting Privacy Leaks
in iOS Applications. In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
(NDSS), San Diego, CA, 2011.
[5] M. Egele, C. Kruegel, E. Kirda, H. Yin, andD. X. Song. Dynamic spyware analysis.
In USENIX annual technical conference (ATC), 2007.
[6] M. Fernández-Delgado, E. Cernadas, S. Barro, and D. Amorim. Do we need
hundreds of classifiers to solve real world classification problems? The Journal
of Machine Learning Research (JMLR), 15(1):3133–3181, Jan. 2014.
6http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/03/the-worlds-most-mysterious-potentially
-destructive-malware-is-not-stuxnet/
Ex-Ray: Detection of History-Leaking Browser Extensions ACSAC 2017, December 4–8, 2017, San Juan, PR, USA
[7] C. Gibler, J. Crussell, J. Erickson, and H. Chen. Androidleaks: automatically
detecting potential privacy leaks in android applications on a large scale. In
International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing (TRUST). Springer,
2012.
[8] A. Guha, M. Fredrikson, B. Livshits, and N. Swamy. Verified security for browser
extensions. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland), 2011.
[9] S. Heule, D. Rifkin, A. Russo, and D. Stefan. The most dangerous code in the
browser. In USENIX Hot Topics in Operating Systems (HotOS), Kartause Ittingen,
Switzerland, 2015.
[10] A. Kapravelos, C. Grier, N. Chachra, C. Kruegel, G. Vigna, and V. Paxson. Hulk:
Eliciting malicious behavior in browser extensions. In USENIX Security Sympo-
sium, San Diego, CA, 2014.
[11] A. Lerner, A. K. Simpson, T. Kohno, and F. Roesner. Internet jones and the
raiders of the lost trackers: An archaeological study of web tracking from 1996
to 2016. In USENIX Security Symposium, Austin, TX, 2016.
[12] C. Lever, P. Kotzias, D. Balzarotti, J. Caballero, and M. Antonakakis. A Lustrum
of Malware Network Communication: Evolution and Insights. In Proceedings of
the 38th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, San Jose, CA, USA, May 2017.
[13] D. Lewis. Counterfactuals and comparative possibility. Journal of Philosophical
Logic, 2:2161–2173, 1973.
[14] M. Lindorfer, C. Kolbitsch, and P. M. Comparetti. Detecting Environment-
Sensitive Malware. In Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID), 2011.
[15] N. K. Malhotra, S. S. Kim, and J. Agarwal. Internet users’ information privacy
concerns (iuipc): The construct, the scale, and a causal model. Information sys-
tems research, 15(4):336–355, 2004.
[16] E. Mariconti, J. Onaolapo, G. Ross, and G. Stringhini. The cause of all evils: As-
sessing causality between user actions and malware activity. In USENIX Work-
shop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test (CSET), 2017.
[17] J. R. Mayer and J. C. Mitchell. Third-party web tracking: Policy and technology.
In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland), 2012.
[18] N. Nikiforakis, L. Invernizzi, A. Kapravelos, S. Van Acker, W. Joosen, C. Kruegel,
F. Piessens, and G. Vigna. You are what you include: large-scale evaluation of
remote javascript inclusions. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security (CCS), 2012.
[19] P. Refaeilzadeh, L. Tang, and H. Liu. Cross-validation. In Encyclopedia of data-
base systems, pages 532–538. Springer, 2009.
[20] F. Roesner, T. Kohno, and D. Wetherall. Detecting and defending against third-
party tracking on the web. In USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design
and Implementation (NSDI), San Jose, CA, 2012.
[21] G. A. Seber and A. J. Lee. Linear regression analysis. John Wiley & Sons, 2012.
[22] A. J. Smola and B. Schölkopf. A tutorial on support vector regression. Statistics
and computing, 14(3), 2004.
[23] S. Sousa, F. G. Martin, M. C. M. Alvim-Ferraz, and M. C. Pereira. Multiple linear
regression and artificial neural networks based on principal components to pre-
dict ozone concentrations. Environmental Modelling & Software, 22(1):97–103,
2007.
[24] O. Starov and N. Nikiforakis. Extended tracking powers: Measuring the privacy
diffusion enabled by browser extensions. In Proceedings of the 26th International
Conference on World Wide Web, 2017.
[25] K. M. Tan and R. A. Maxion. “why 6?” defining the operational limits of stide,
an anomaly-based intrusion detector. In Security and Privacy, 2002. Proceedings.
2002 IEEE Symposium on, pages 188–201. IEEE, 2002.
[26] K. Thomas, E. Bursztein, C. Grier, G. Ho, N. Jagpal, A. Kapravelos, D. McCoy,
A. Nappa, V. Paxson, P. Pearce, N. Provos, and M. A. Rajab. Ad injection at
scale: Assessing deceptive advertisement modifications. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (Oakland), 2015.
[27] M. Weissbacher. These chrome extensions spy on 8 million users.
http://mweissbacher.com/blog/2016/03/31/these-chrome-extensions-spy
-on-8-million-users/, 2016.
[28] C. Wressnegger, G. Schwenk, D. Arp, and K. Rieck. A close look on n-grams in
intrusion detection: anomaly detection vs. classification. In Proceedings of the
2013 ACM workshop on Artificial intelligence and security, pages 67–76. ACM,
2013.
[29] X. Xing, W.Meng, B. Lee, U.Weinsberg, A. Sheth, R. Perdisci, andW. Lee. Under-
standing malvertising through ad-injecting browser extensions. In International
Conference on World Wide Web (WWW). ACM, 2015.
A CASE STUDY OF A LARGE HISTORY DATA
COLLECTOR
As case study we look into SimilarWeb, one of the actors in data
collection in browser extensions. We conducted this study before
developing Ex-Ray, as the findings turned out to be symptomatic
for a wider range of extensions, the findings motivated develop-
ment of our system [27].
SimilarWeb is a company that offers insights into third-party
Web analytics. To the end user the functionality is similar to Google
Analytics, except that visitors can see traffic details of websites
neither they or SimilarWeb are affiliated with. This is useful for
analysis of competitors, or to explore new markets for a product.
Using the free version of their service, the presented informa-
tion includes information on visitors, search, and advertising. The
data is detailed, including number of visitors, average visit dura-
tion, search keywords used, countries of origin, referring sites, des-
tination sites that the visitors leave through, and others.
A.1 Origins of Data
As the company does not have direct access to these data sources,
the displayed data must be extrapolated from data which is acces-
sible to them. This high resolution of data without direct access
motivated further investigations. Their website suggest use of four
types of data sources including A panel of monitored devices, cur-
rently the largest in the industry.
A.2 SimilarWeb Chrome Extension
As first step we analyzed the extension offered on their website.
The offered main functionality consists of suggesting sites similar
to the one currently seen. After reviewing their code and analyz-
ing network traffic, we noticed suspicious behavior. The extension
intercepts requests for all websites and reports any URL or search
query to SimilarWeb in real time, including metadata such as re-
ferrers. We noticed that the JavaScript library used for tracking
was developed by another company, Upalytics.7 The purpose of
this library is to track user behavior in Chrome extensions, other
platforms are advertised on their website as well, including mobile
and desktop. Since this was an external library, we suspected it
might be used in other extensions as well.
A.3 Finding More Extensions
After crawling the Chrome extension store we found 42 suspicious
extensions by searching for code similarities. To verify malicious
behavior we manually analyzed each extension under the aspect
of four questions:
• Does the extension have the capability to exfiltrate private
data?
• Does tracking happen “out of the box,” or does the user
have to opt-in?
• Is this behavior mentioned in the terms of service?
• If not, is there a link in the terms of service that explains
the behavior of the extension?
All suspicious extensions were able to collect history, all but one
were tracking out of the box. The only extension that offered opt-
in was SpeakIt!, however, they only switched to that model after a
user complained about the included spyware on an issue tracker.8
Of these 42 extensions 19 explain their data collection practices in
the terms of service, while 23 do not. Furthermore, out of these 23
extensions 12 have no URL where this would be explained. One
URL that is used across 13 extensions to explain the privacy ram-
ifications is http://addons-privacy.com. The text is a copy of the
7http://www.upalytics.com
8https://github.com/skechboy/SpeakIt/issues/12
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(a) Neighboring relationships of IPs between seemingly unrelated
domains used for monitoring.
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(b) Graph linking domain names by IP relationships used in 42 ex-
tensions to covertly collect browsing history.
Figure 5: Domains receiving data from the upalytics.com li-
brary reported to a network of domains that can be linked
by IP neighborship.
upalytics.com privacy policy rendered into a PNG image. The
content explains that personal information including browsing his-
tory and IP data will be collected. Throughout the document in-
stead of specific company names only general language such as
“our product” or “company” is used. It can be used as a template
for any extension using such tracking. While the URL is shared be-
tween extensions, the developers have no obvious connection. Six
of the remaining domains point to the same IP address. Some ver-
sions of the privacy policy reference California Civil Code Section
1798.83, which allows for inquiry about usage of personal informa-
tion for direct marketing purposes.9 We sent emails to two of the
email addresses, we received responses after less than a month.
A.4 Network Information
The extensions used nine different hardcoded hostnames to receive
tracking information, we found relations linking all 42 extensions.
All endpoint domains, addons-privacy.com, and upalytics.com
were registered by Domains by Proxy, a service used to obfuscate
ownership of domain names by hiding WHOIS records.10 All ex-
tensions were reporting to subdomains http://lb.*. Some of the
names of the domains appear to be misleading, suggesting updates
or being a searchhelper. Two of the domains (connectupdate.com,
secureweb24.net) were registered 13 seconds apart. Also, the ro-
bots.txt file used in all cases is the same.
Furthermore, all these IPs belong to the same hoster, XLHost.
Eight out of nine of these hosts have all addresses in a /18 net-
work, half of the IPs of the upalytics.com endpoint are in another
XLHost network. All IPs in use are unique, however, this involves
consecutive IP addresses and other neighborhood relationships.
All hosts used round robin DNS, using multiple IPs for each do-
main name. To examine this closer we compared the distance of IP
addresses used by these extensions for tracking. In Figure 5b, the
nodes are the nine domain names in use, edges are the grade of dis-
tance. By taking into account distances of up to four, we can link
together all hostnames used in all 42 extensions. For example: IPs
1.1.1.1 and 1.1.1.3 have a distance of two. As for the labels, the
edge between similarsites.com and thetrafficstat.net reads
6x2. This means that the domains share six IP addresses with a
distance of two. Figure 5a visualizes the distance relationship be-
tween lb.crdui.com and lb.datarating.com.
A.5 Reported Extensions
After reporting our findings, all extensions were removed from
the Chrome store within 24 hours, including the official Similar-
Web and SimilarSites extensions - a partner site. We hope that loss
of installations from the Chrome store will deter developers from
bundling malicious libraries in the future.
B POSSIBLE COLLABORATION OF
TRACKERS
In our honeypot experiment we use URLs unique to each extension.
Should we receive incoming connections to such URLs we can link
them to the extension which leaked it. As described in Section 4.1
we receive incoming connections often briefly after executing an
extension. Other than the behavior over time, another aspect is
possible collaboration between extension authors.
When multiple hosts connect to the same generated URL, or
hosts connect to multiple URLs unique to an extension, we group
them together. These groups are indicators for a possible form of
data sharing or shared infrastructure between trackers. An overview
of these groups is shown in Table 3.
9https://epic.org/privacy/profiling/sb27.html
10https://www.domainsbyproxy.com
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Extension Name Connecting from
Sochabra for Stand Alone [translated]
UpTop
centro-77.grapeshot.co.uk
centro-78.grapeshot.co.uk
500px image downloader
BazaarHero
DealBeaver
EyeEm Image Downloader
Facebook Image downloader
Flickr image downloader
Image Downloader for Facebook & Instagram
Pinterest Image downloader
ec2-176-34-94-65.eu-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com
ec2-54-195-168-122.eu-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com
ec2-54-246-25-158.eu-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com
ABC ad blocking China special edition [translated]
CTRL-ALT-DEL new tab
Desprotetor de Links
Pop up blocker for Chrome
Similar Sites
nat-service.aws.kontera.com
Chistodeti
Woopages
199.175.48.183
static.36.51.9.176.clients.your-server.de
Table 3: In our honeypot probe we observed hosts that connected tomultiple URLs unique to extensions, and conversely URLs
that received connections from multiple hosts. These relations are possible indicators for a form of data sharing or shared
infrastructure between trackers. Each line in this table consists of such a connected group.
